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Abstract— Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is an emerging 
technology now-a-days and has a wide range of applications such 
as battlefield surveillance, traffic surveillance, forest fire 
detection, flood detection etc. But wireless sensor networks are 
susceptible to a variety of potential attacks which obstructs the 
normal operation of the network. The security of a wireless 
sensor network is compromised because of the random 
deployment of sensor nodes in open environment, memory 
limitations, power limitations and unattended nature. This paper 
focuses on various attacks that manifest in the network and 
provides a tabular representation of the attacks, their effects and 
severity. The paper depicts a comparison of attacks basis packet 
loss and packet corruption. Also, the paper discusses the known 
defence mechanisms and countermeasures against the attacks. 
 
Keywords— wireless sensor network, security, attacks, defence 
mechanism. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Network consists of a large number of small 
and low cost sensor nodes which are randomly deployed in an 
area. The sensor nodes have computational capability to carry 
out simple computations and transmit the required information 
[1]. These nodes transmit information to the sink node that 
aggregates the entire information received from other nodes 
and generates a summary data to be transmitted to another 
network. These sensor nodes can collectively monitor physical 
and environmental conditions like pressure, temperature, 
humidity and sound vibrations. Such features ensure a wide 
range of applications for wireless sensor network such as 
military, medical, industrial, disaster relief operations, 
environmental monitoring, traffic surveillance, agriculture, 
infrastructure monitoring [1, 2]. Since the majority of sensor 
nodes are deployed in hostile environment, they are 
susceptible to various attacks that are caused by malicious or 
compromised nodes in the network. The malicious nodes can 
alter the normal behaviour of the network, tamper with the 
node’s hardware and software, transmit false information, or 
drop the required information. Hence, security of wireless 
sensor network becomes a critical issue. 
This paper majorly contributes towards the security attacks 
and their defence mechanisms. The paper is structured in the 
following manner: Section 2 discusses about the security goals 
in wireless sensor network. Section 3 provides a 
categorization of security attacks. Section 4 gives their 
detailed explanation. Section 5 gives an explanation of the 
known defence mechanisms to counter the attacks. Section 6 
depicts a graphical representation of the comparison of attacks. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
II. SECURITY GOALS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
A wireless sensor network shares some common features 
with the traditional network and also has unique features of its 
own that distinguishes it from the traditional network. 
Therefore, the security goals or requirements cover both the 
traditional network goals and the goals suited solely to the 
wireless sensor network. The security goals can be classified 
into two types: Primary and Secondary goals. We discuss both 
of them. 
A. Primary Goals 
1) Data Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the means of 
limiting information access to only the authorized 
users and preventing access or disclosure by the 
unauthorized users. Data confidentiality is the most 
important issue that any network must address. Sensor 
nodes carry sensitive data which must be concealed 
from the malicious nodes or attackers. If sensor nodes 
are not capable of keeping the data confidential, then 
any neighbouring node can tamper with the data and 
transmit false information. This can cause serious 
hazards, especially in military applications. 
2) Data Authentication: Data authentication is the ability 
of a receiver to verify that the data received by it is 
from a correct sender. In a wireless sensor network, 
data can not only be tampered by the malicious nodes 
but the entire packet stream can be changed by 
addition of false packets to it. So, a receiver must be 
able to identify if the data originated from the correct 
source or not. Data authentication can be achieved 
using symmetric key cryptography where the sender 
and receiver share a secret key or using asymmetric 
key cryptography where the data can be encrypted and 
decrypted using public and private keys. 
3) Data Availability: Data availability determines if the 
services of the network are available in case of failure 
or presence of attacks in the network. A single point 
failure in the network can threaten the availability of 
resources and other services. So, data availability is of 
prime importance and is responsible for the operation 
of the network. 
4) Data Integrity: The malicious nodes in the network can 
manipulate the data in the packets [3]. Data integrity 
ensures that the received data is not altered in transit. It 
confirms that the data is reliable and has not been 
altered or changed. The network must incorporate 
security mechanisms against different attacks caused 
by malicious nodes so as to ensure integrity of the data. 
 
B. Secondary Goals 
1) Data Freshness: Data freshness determines that the 
data is recent and no old packets have been replayed. It 
is important to ensure the freshness of the message, 
apart from ensuring data confidentiality and integrity. 
There are two types of data freshness: Weak freshness 
that provides partial message ordering but doesn’t 
provide any delay information and strong freshness, 
which provides total message ordering and delay 
estimation [4]. Weak freshness is used for sensor 
measurements while strong freshness is employed in 
time synchronization in the network. 
2) Self-Organization: The sensor nodes in a wireless 
sensor network are randomly deployed and have no 
fixed infrastructure. So, these sensor nodes must have 
self-organising capability so that they can dynamically 
organise according to the environment and situation. 
Self-organising capability is important to ensure multi-
hop routing, key management and building trust 
relations with the neighbours. If self-organising 
capability lacks in a sensor network, then damage 
resulting from attacks can be significant. 
3) Time Synchronisation: Most sensor network 
applications rely on some form of time synchronization. 
When a packet travels between two pairwise sensors, 
sensors can compute the end-to-end delay of a packet. 
A more collaborative sensor network may require 
group synchronization for tracking applications [5]. 
4) Secure Organization: The utility of a sensor network 
relies on its ability to accurately and automatically 
locate each sensor in the network. Wireless sensor 
networks which are expected to locate faults needs 
accurate information about a location in order to 
indicate a fault’s location. Unfortunately, a malicious 
node can manipulate non secured location information 
by reporting false signal strengths, replaying signals 
[6].  
III. ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
A passive attack involves monitoring and listening of the data 
stream but doesn’t involve modification of the data stream. 
Passive attacks do not cause direct harm to the network as 
they cannot modify the data. Attacks against privacy are a 
passive attack. The classification of passive attacks is shown 
in Fig.1. 
A. Attacks against privacy 
Sensor networks allow the availability of large volumes of 
data through remote access. This causes a privacy problem as 
the malicious nodes can easily obtain information without 
being physically available to maintain surveillance. So, the 
malicious nodes can gather information at low-risk in an 
anonymous manner [7]. The attacks against privacy are 
classified into three categories as shown in Fig.1. 
1) Eavesdropping: In eavesdropping, a malicious node 
simply overhears the data stream to gain knowledge 
about the communication content. When the network 
traffic transmits control information about the sensor 
network configuration that contains detailed 
information about the network, eavesdropping can act 
effectively against privacy protection. 
2) Traffic Analysis: Malicious nodes can analyse the 
network traffic to determine which nodes have high 
activity. Once the highly active sensor nodes are 
discovered, the malicious nodes can cause harm to 
those sensor nodes. 
3) Camouflage: Malicious nodes can hide in the sensor 
network by masquerading as normal sensor nodes. So 
they deceive the other sensor nodes and attract packets 
from them. After receiving the packets, malicious 
nodes can either misroute the packets or eventually 
drop the packets. 
B. Active Attacks 
An active attack involves monitoring, listening and 
modification of the data stream by the malicious 
nodes/adversaries prevailing inside or outside the network. 
Active attacks cause direct harm to the network because they 
can manipulate the data stream. There are many types of 
active attacks. In this paper we focus mainly on the routing 
attacks in the network. The classification of active attacks is 
shown in Fig.1. 
IV. ROUTING ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
The attacks which act on the network layer are called routing 
attacks. These attacks occur while routing messages. We 
discuss the following routing attacks. 
 
A. Sybil Attack 
 
Sybil Attack is named after the subject of the book Sybil, a 
case study of a woman diagnosed with multiple fake identities. 
These fake identities are known as Sybil nodes. The Sybil 
nodes can out vote the honest nodes in the system. Usually, 
peer to peer systems are vulnerable to Sybil attack. Examples 
of vulnerable systems include vehicular Ad hoc Network, 
Distributed Storage Applications in Peer to Peer Systems, 
Routing in a Distributed Peer to Peer System [8], etc. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Black hole Attack 
 
A black hole is a malicious node that attracts all the traffic 
in the network by advertising that it has the shortest path in 
the network [9]. So, it creates a metaphorical black hole 
with the malicious node or the adversary at the center. This 
black hole drops all the packets it receives from the other 
nodes. 
  
In a black hole attack, malicious nodes do not send true 
control messages. To execute a black hole attack, malicious 
node awaits the neighboring nodes to send RREQ messages. 
When the malicious nodes receive RREQ message from its 
neighboring nodes, it immediately sends a false RREP 
message providing a route to the destination over itself. In 
this way, it assigns a high sequence number to be settled in 
the routing table of victim node, before true nodes send a 
genuine reply. Therefore, requesting nodes assume that 
route discovery process is completed and ignore RREP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
messages from other nodes and start sending packets over 
malicious node. This is how malicious nodes attacks all the  
RREQ messages and takes over all the routes in the network. 
Therefore, all the packets are sent to the malicious node 
from where they are never forwarded and eventually 
dropped. This is called a black hole akin to real meaning 
which swallows all objects and matter [10]. 
 
C. Denial of Service Attack 
 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is one that attempts to 
prevent the victim from being able to use all or part of 
his/her network connection [11]. DoS attack allows an 
adversary to subvert, disrupt, or destroy a network, and also 
to diminish a network’s capability to provide a service [5].  
 
Dos attack extends to all the layers of the protocol stack. 
They are usually very difficult to prevent because they exist 
in many forms inside the network. For example, a malicious 
node can send huge number of requests to a server which 
has to test the legitimacy of the nodes. Due to the huge 
number of requests, the server will be busy in testing illegal 
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Fig. 1. Classification of Attacks on WSN. 
requests and so, it will not be available for the legal users. 
This causes performance degradation of the entire network 
as the network gets congested because of illegal requests.  
 
D. Wormhole Attack 
 
Wormhole attack is an attack on the routing protocol in 
which the packets or individual bits of the packets are 
captured at one location, tunnelled to another location and 
then replayed at another location [12],[13]. In this attack the 
two colluding nodes create an illusion that the locations 
involved are directly connected though they are actually 
distant. 
 
E. Hello Flood Attack 
 
Most protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO 
PACKETS to show their presence to their neighbours and 
the receiving nodes may assume that it is within the RF 
range of the sender. This assumption may prove to be false 
when a laptop-class attacker transmit routing information 
with an abnormally high transmission power to prove every 
other node in the network that the malicious node is its 
neighbour. Such an attack in the network is called a hello 
flood attack [14]. 
 
F. Grey hole Attack 
 
A grey hole attack is a variation of black hole attack in 
which the nodes selectively drops packets [15]. There are 
two ways in which a node can drop packets: 
 It can drop all UDP packets while transmitting all 
TCP packets. 
 It can drop 50% of the packets or can drop them with 
probabilistic distribution. 
 
    In a grey hole attack a normal node can prevent from 
behaving usually and therefore this attack is difficult to 
detect. A grey hole attack affects one or two nodes in the 
network whereas a black hole attack affects the whole 
network.  
 
V. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ROUTING ATTACKS  
 
A. Countermeasure against Sybil Attack 
 
1)Trusted certification:  This type of method assumes 
that there is a special trusted third party or central authority, 
which can verify the validity of each participant, and further 
issues a certification for the honest one [8]. In reality, such 
certification can be a special hardware device [16] or a digital 
number [17]. Note that essentially both of them are a series of 
digits present on different medias. Before a participant joins a 
peer-to-peer system to provide votes or to obtain its services, 
his identity must first be verified [18]. 
 
2) Sybil Guard: The Sybil nodes in a Sybil attack are 
connected to the honest nodes via attack edges. Attack edges 
are difficult for Sybil nodes to create and hence they are few 
in number. It leads to Sybil nodes and honest nodes being 
completely isolated and connected together by a few attack 
edges. From a trusted node, there are a number of random 
paths with fixed length known as verifiers. The Sybil guard 
checks a suspected node by sending random paths from the 
suspected node. If the random path intersects with verifier 
then the suspected node is said to be verified once. After the 
node is verified a particular number of times, the suspected 
node is said to be trusted node otherwise it is said to be a Sybil 
node [19].  
 
B. Countermeasures against Black hole Attack 
 
1) REWARD technique: REWARD is a routing technique 
where a wireless sensor network is organized as a distributed 
data base to detect black hole attack. The distributed data base 
maintains a record for suspicious nodes and areas. This 
routing algorithm consists of two types of broadcast messages, 
MISS (material for intersection of suspicious sets) and 
SAMBA (suspicious area, mark a black-hole attack). The 
destination node broadcasts a MISS message when it doesn’t 
receive a packet within a specified time. The destination 
copies the list of all the involved nodes to the MISS message. 
The nodes listed in the MISS message are counted as 
suspicious nodes. The SAMBA message provides the location 
of the black-hole attack. If a malicious node does not forward 
packets, the previous node in the path will broadcast a 
SAMBA message [20].   
 
2) Path based Detection Algorithm: In path based approach, a 
node watches only the next hop neighbor in the current route 
path rather than observing every node in the neighbor [21]. To 
implement the algorithm, every node maintains a 
FwdPktBuffer (packet digest buffer). When a packet is 
forwarded, its digest it added to the FwdPktBuffer and the 
detecting node overhears the transmission. Once it is 
overheard that the next hop forwarded the packet, the digest is 
released from the FwdPktBuffer. The detecting node 
calculates the overhear rate of its next hop neighbor and 
compares it with the threshold. If the forwarding rate is lower 
than the threshold value, the detecting node considers the next 
hop neighbor as a black hole and avoids sending packets via 
the suspect node in future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Exponential Trust based mechanism: In this method, a 
streak counter (n) is maintained which keeps track of the 
packets that have been dropped consecutively. If a packet is 
dropped the counter is incremented but if a packet is 
forwarded the counter is reset to zero. It uses the fact that in a 
black hole attack all the packets are dropped. A tolerance 
factor (X) is set for the environment in which the mechanism 
is deployed. The mechanism uses the streak counter to 
calculate a trust factor using the formula 100*  for each 
node [22]. When a packet is dropped the trust factor drops 
exponentially. When the trust factor goes below a threshold 
value the node is declared as malicious.  
 
4) Reliability Analysis mechanism: This method combines 
AODV protocol with reliability analysis [23]. It consists of a 
DRI table which keeps track of the no. of packets sent and 
received. Based on this information, it calculates the reliability 
ratio of the route that consists of the neighbors of node.  
 
 
 
It also consists of an REL packet which is sent when the 
reliable route has been discovered. REL packets maintain the 
count of reliability for each node.  
 
C. Countermeasures against Denial of Service Attack 
 
1) Firewall and Router Filtering: A firewall is a router or a 
computer that monitors packet traffic and protects the system 
from malicious access. Firewalls can be used as a relay or as a 
semi-transparent gateway for DoS countermeasure [11].  
 
Firewall as Semi-transparent gateway: The firewall sends 
SYN packets to the host and the host replies with a 
SYN+ACK packet. When the firewall receives SYN+ACK 
packet from the host, it forwards it to the client and also sends 
an ACK packet to the host. If the firewall does not receive an 
ACK from the client within a certain timeout period, it 
terminates the connection by sending an RST packet to the 
host. The duplicate ACK that arrives at the host is discarded 
by the TCP protocol for legitimate connections, and 
succeeding packets flow without intervention by the firewall 
[24]. In this approach, no delays are introduced for legitimate 
connections. 
  
Firewall as a Relay: The firewall responds on behalf of the 
internal host. During an attack, the firewall responds to the 
SYN sent by the attacker; since the ACK never arrives, an 
RST packet is sent to terminate the connection, and the host 
never receives the datagram. For legal connections, the 
firewall creates a new connection to the internal host on behalf 
of the client, and continues to perform as a proxy for 
translation of sequence numbers of packets that flow between 
the client and server [24]. In this approach, the host is 
completely shielded against a DoS attack and doesn’t receive 
spoofed SYN packets ever.  
2) Cookies: Cookie-based approach uses a one-way hash 
function to verify if the connection requests are legitimate. 
Bernstein and Bona suggested a stateless cookie approach. 
When a client sends a SYN packet, the server calculates a 
one-way hash of the sender's sequence number, ports, the 
server's secret key, and a counter which changes after every 
one minute [25]. The server sends the result of the one-way 
hash to the client. When the client replies with an ACK packet, 
the server again calculates the same hash function and 
discards the packet if it fails to authenticate with the server 
[25]. Otherwise, the server sets up the connection, if it doesn't 
already exist. Since CPU time is used to calculate hash values, 
memory is never exhausted by SYN flood DOS attacks.  
 
D. Countermeasures against Wormhole Attack 
 
1) Packet Leashes: A leash is an extra piece of information 
that is added to a packet to restrict its maximum travel 
distance. There are two types of leashes: geographical leashes 
and temporal leashes. A geographical leash [12] ensures that 
the recipient of the packet is within a certain distance from the 
sender [12]. A temporal leash makes sure that the packet has a 
certain upper bound on its lifetime, which restricts its 
maximum travel distance. Both the types of leashes can be 
used to prevent wormhole attack. 
 
2) True Link: True Link is a countermeasure which protects 
against wormhole attack using the combination of two phases: 
rendezvous phase and authentication phase. True link 
considers two nodes i and j. In the rendezvous phase, i and j 
exchange randomly generated numbers known as a nonce [26]. 
This phase is completed as a single RTS-CTS-DATA-ACK 
exchange. In this phase the timing constraints are very strict 
and makes it impossible for the attacker to relay these frames 
as only the direct neighbour can respond in time. In the 
authentication phase, i and j authenticate themselves as the 
originator of their respective nonce by sending signed 
messages 
 
E. Countermeasures against Hello Flood Attack 
 
1) Identity Verification Protocol: One of the defence against 
hello flood attack involves every node to authenticate each of 
its neighbours with an identity verification protocol using a 
trusted base stations [14]. In this case hello flood attack is 
prevented only when the malicious node has a powerful 
transmitter because the protocol checks the bidirectionality of 
the link. This bidirectionality check does not prevent any 
compromised node from authenticating itself to a large 
number of nodes in the network. Since such a malicious node 
is required to authenticate itself to each and every victim 
before launching an attack, a malicious node claiming to be a 
neighbour of abnormally large number of nodes is said to be 
alarming. 
 
 
2) AODV-HFDP: Another method to prevent hello flood 
attack is a signal strength and time and threshold based 
AODV-HFDP(Ad-hoc On demand Distance Routing with 
Hello flood Detection cum Prevention) [27].In this approach it 
is assumed that all nodes have same signal strength within the 
same radio range. Each node verifies the signal strength of the 
(1) 
received hello packet with its own. If it is found to be the 
same then the node is declared as a friend else a stranger.    
 
F. Countermeasures against Grey hole Attack 
 
1) Multipath routing: Multipath routing can be used to protect 
against selective forwarding. [28]Messages routed over n 
completely different paths are completely protected against 
selective forwarding attacks involving at most n compromised 
nodes and still offer some probabilistic protection when over n 
nodes are compromised. The use of multiple braided paths 
(which may have nodes in common but no links in common) 
may provide probabilistic protection against selective 
forwarding using only localised information. Allowing nodes 
to dynamically choose a packet’s next hop probabilistically 
from a set of possible candidates can further reduce the 
chances of an adversary gaining complete control of a data 
flow. 
 
2) CHEMAS (Checkpoint-based Multi-hop Acknowledgement 
Scheme): This scheme uses three types of packets: event 
packet, ACK packets and alert packets [29]. This scheme is 
based on checkpoint-by-checkpoint acknowledgement instead 
of hop-by-hop acknowledgement. The basic idea of this 
scheme is based on checkpoint nodes which are selected from 
the part of intermediate nodes. The path is divided into several 
segments which consist of forwarding path between two 
checkpoint nodes. When the source node detects a special 
event it generates an event packet. The packet traverses hop-
by-hop towards the base station and each intermediate node 
saves the event packet in its cache before sending it 
downstream. When the checkpoint nodes receive the event 
packet it generates an ACK packet and sends it to upstream 
neighbour. The ACK packets traverse the same but reversed 
path upstream. It traverses at least two segments before being 
dropped by an upstream checkpoint. Thus all the intermediate 
nodes in these two checkpoints know that previous event has 
safely arrived in the downstream checkpoint. If the ACK 
packet is not received from downstream by all the nodes in 
these two segments then the next downstream neighbouring 
node is declared as suspicious and the alert packet is generated. 
VI. COMPARISON OF ATTACKS 
In this paper, we compare all the six routing attacks based on 
parameters like number of packets corrupted and number of 
packets lost.  This comparison gives us an analysis of which 
attack can cause maximum harm to the system and decrease 
the reliability and security of the system. Fig. 2 depicts a 
comparison of attacks that clearly shows the percentage of 
packet loss by each attack. Fig. 3 depicts another comparison 
that shows the percentage of packet corruption caused by each 
attack.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks are vulnerable to many types of 
attacks due to deployment of sensor nodes in an unattended 
environment. In this survey, firstly we have given the security 
goals of a network. Next, we have classified the attacks in 
WSN in two categories i.e. active and passive attacks. Further, 
we have given the definition of these types of attacks and have 
also given the known defences and countermeasures against 
them. This survey also gives the tabular classification of 
attacks and determines the severity of each attack. We hope 
that this survey will help future researches in developing a 
good knowledge about the attacks and their countermeasures. 
 
TABLE 1 
ATTACKS ON WSN 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of attacks based on Packet Loss. 
Fig. 3. Comparison of attacks based on Packet Corruption. 
Attack Name Attack Definition Attack Effects Severity 
Eavesdropping  Overhearing the communication 
channel to gather confidential 
data . 
 Reduces data confidentiality 
  Extracts vital WSN information 
 Threatens  privacy protection of WSN 
 
Low 
Traffic Analysis  Monitoring the network traffic 
and computing parameters that 
affect the network.  
 Degradation of network performance 
 Increased packet collision 
 Increased contention 
 Traffic distortion 
 
Low 
Camouflage Malicious nodes masquerade as 
normal nodes to attract packets. 
 Increased packet loss/corruption 
 False data to network 
 
Low 
Sybil  Impersonation by malicious nodes 
as multiple fake identities to 
attract packets from nodes.  
 Packet loss/ corruption 
 False sensor readings 
 Modification of routing information 
 
High 
Black hole  Attracting all the possible traffic 
to a compromised node.  Can 
result in launch of other attacks.  
 Triggers other attacks like wormhole, 
eavesdropping 
 Exhausts all the network resources 
 Packet dropping/ corruption 
 Modification of routing information 
 
High 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) 
Prevents the user from being able 
to use the network services. 
Extends to all the layers of 
protocol stack. 
 Reduces WSN availability 
 Affects physical layer, link layer, 
network layer, transport layer and 
application layer 
 Prevents access to network services by 
the user. 
 
High 
Wormhole  Tunneling and replaying 
messages from one location to 
another via low latency links that 
connect two nodes of WSN. 
 Changes normal message stream  
 False routes / misdirection 
 Forged routing 
 Changes network topology 
 
High 
Hello Flood  Transmission of a message by 
malicious node with an 
abnormally high transmission 
power to make the nodes believe 
that it is their neighbor 
 False / misleading routes generated 
 Route disruption 
 Packet loss 
 Confusion 
 
High 
Grey hole Selective dropping of packets by 
attracting packets to a 
compromised node.  
 Suppresses messages in an area 
 Packet loss and information fabrication 
 Launch other active attacks 
High 
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